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The Historic Role of the
Supreme Court
By JomH P. FRAxx*
The Supreme Court of the United States has a job to do for the
American people. My task today is to examine into what that job
is. While I shall finish with some appraisal and some estimate of
what the American community can reasonably expect from this
institution of its Government, the forepart of my remarks will be
largely descriptive.
Let me begin by borrowing a phrase from the personnel
people. What I mean to talk about here is a job description. To
put the question at a deliberately low level to make it vivid, the
American people pay out some $315,500 a year in salaries to a
total of nine men, plus the dollar expenditure for their miscel-
laneous supporting help, plus the upkeep of their building, and
so on. For all this, the taxpayer should get a certain value; he
can reasonably expect to have a job performed. What is that job?
The original outline of the task to be done was surely brief
enough. Article III of the Constitution provides concisely that
"the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court" plus such lower Courts as Congress may desire.
It then, in only one sentence broken into nine clauses, defines
what the judicial power is.' The Article further provides that in
a very small number of cases the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
* Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona. Formerly Associate Professor of Law, Yale Uni-
versity. Author of Mr. Justice Black, Marble Palace, and Cases on Constitutional
Law.
1 U.S. Const. Art. III § 2 provides:
The judical Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.
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original, adds a detail or two about impeachment, jury trial, and
treason, and is done. There are 167 words in the controlling two
sentences of the Article, and it is 169 years since the Court first
sat. In those years, the Court has put bulk on the simple frame-
work of the Constitution. Fundamentally, therefore, our under-
standing of the work of the institution must come from that 169
years of history in which the Court has had the primary respon-
sibility of developing its own job.
To develop a description of the job the Court does, we may
compare its work in the earliest and at the most recent time. Cur-
rently the Court processes something like 1600 cases in a year.
Of this number, around 750 or 800 are on the Miscellaneous
Docket. These are basically applications for review of criminal
cases filed by persons in Federal criminal institutions. A very
small percentage of these-between three and four percent be-
tween 1954 and 1957-are granted and transferred to the Appel-
late Docket. These include another group of a similar sort also
on the miscellaneous docket running usually 100-150 cases a year,
and which the number granted is almost zero.2 While these 750-
800 cases give a substantial administrative burden to the Court in
sifting out the very few cases worth serious processing, they result
in a very minor portion of the Court's written work.
Meanwhile, there are in each year about 700 Petitions for Cer-
tiorari, and about one hundred Appeals. 3 From these come the
major work of the Court: the hearing of argument and the dis-
position of the cases. The number of cases argued and disposed of,
either by individual opinions or by per curiam opinions after argu-
ment, for 1956 and 1957 was about 125 a year. The total number
of opinions for 1958-59 was 114.
For the purpose of obtaining a comparable figure, let us turn
back the clock to the days of John Marshall. In 1801 that worthy
gentleman mounted the Bench to become the fourth Chief Justice
of the United States and the foremost moulder of its Constitution.
The judicial business was still slight, so that the Justices served
both as trial judges around the country and as Justices on the ap-
pellate court in Washington. There in a few months each year,
they could dispose of their business; it was to be about fifty years
2 1958 Director Admin. Off. Ann. Rep. 146.
3 Id. at 144-145. There are also the few original cases.
KENTucEY LAw JomaNAL
before the docket was to become sufficiently crowded to make it
difficult for the Court to finish its work in a year. As a result, to
find a comparable number of cases with those disposed of by our
Court in our own day in one year, we must group several of Mar-
shall's years. The first seven years of his service, the years from
1801 through 1807, accumulate 107 opinions, a number roughly
comparable with the single year just closed.
The chart immediately following gives a rough statistical
breakdown of the job the Court was performing a little over a
century and a half ago with the job it is performing now. The
comparison is, of course, purely numerical and involves a certain
number of arbitrary judgements by way of classification; but,





A. Public regulation of business
Salvage and prize .................... 11
Public lands .................................. 8
B. Taxation .................................. 9
C. General Commercial
Bills and notes ......................... 8
Bankruptcy and other credit .... 15
Miscellaneous contracts ............. 8
Insurance .................................. 6
Criminal Law
Jurisdiction and procedure ...... 81
Aliens and citizenship ................... 2
Salves ........................................... 2
Estates and real estate .................. 4
107
COURT, 1801-07 and 1959-59
1958-59
Economic Problems
A. Public regulation of business
General regulatory acts ....... 15
Anti-trust ................................... 7
I.C.C. and motor carrier ............ 6
Due process and equal protection..2
B. Taxation .................. 6
C. General commercial
Admiralty ................................... 2
D. Condemnation ............................ 1
Criminal Law ............................... 18
Jurisdiction and procedure ...... 17
Aliens and citizenship ................. 1




Federal-State Relations .............. 19
114
However, one very special caution must be noted concerning
the comparative figures, even for purposes of comparing raw
numbers. Between 1801 and 1807, the Court was still only po-
tentially a national institution. It had the dual task of being the
Supreme Court of the United States and also the Supreme Court
for the District of Columbia, then newly formed. A flood of Dis-
trict business, long since cut off, was just getting under way. Be-
tween 1801 and 1815, almost thirty-five percent of the business of
the Court came out of the District of Columbia.4 In the year 1806,
4 Frank, "Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System," 13 Law and
Contemp. Prob. 3, 16 (1948).
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for example, of the Court's twenty-eight cases, eleven came up
from the District and five more came from the adjacent States
of Maryland and Virginia, leaving a total of twelve for the whole
rest of the country. In these early days practical factors of proxi-
mity obviously had considerable to do with the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, and this is a factor which has disappeared with the
passage of time.
Nonetheless, for all its imperfections, the chart suggests some
stimulating avenues of thought. Since, generally speaking, the
business of America is business, we may note that in both periods
a substantial part of the work of the Court concerns the business
of making a living. And yet while this superficial comparison
exists, the nature of life in the United States has changed so much
in the intervening time that the nature of these economic cases is
indeed radical and different. In the early 19th Century, manu-
facturing industry had barely begun. The cotton gin was but a
few years old, and Eli Whitney was turning his attention to the
first American manufacture of machine tools. Wide scale banking
was just beginning, insurance was still a new industry, and the
dominant American businesses were still agriculture, shipping and
land speculation.
In the early 19th Century the entire American economy was
feeling the effects of the Napoleonic Wars. The shipping interests
vacillated in attitude as to whether the English or the French
were causing more disruption. As an aftermath principally of the
undeclared war with France in 1798, the Court received a sub-
stantial number of cases involving ship seizures and was called
upon to make some profoundly important judgments concerning
international relations. Also of the highest importance to the na-
tional economy was the speculation in the public lands, which
throughout the 19th Century brought in a stream of cases, and the
Court had its share during the years in question.
Yet quantitatively, the foremost relationship of the Court in
this early period to the general economic life of the country was
first of all in the application of the revenue laws, and second in
formulating the commercial law. The nine cases classified here as
taxation were of a very different sort from what we now contem-
plate in that area. The income, inheritance, and gift taxes which
today have created one of the foremost specialties of the law and
1959]
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which give a steady outpouring of decisions had not then come
into existence. These revenue cases involved principally the cus-
tom laws, or the excise taxes, as, for example, the tax on sugar
refining,5 or the determination of the amount of commission to be
allowed to a collector of the revenue for his good offices."
Forty cases, the largest single block in the group, fall in the
area of the general commercial law. This includes the cases on
commercial paper, the cases on bankruptcy and the other cases
involving enforcement of credit obligations by one remedy or
another, the cases on the interpretation of miscellaneous contracts
and of insurance contracts, and the other cases involving the
shipping industry outside the field of salvage and prize. It is the
absence of those cases and the substitution of a large number of
the public regulation of business cases which represents the most
radical difference in the nature of the work of the Court between
the earlier and the later time. The number of bills and notes, bank-
ruptcy, miscellaneous contracts and insurance cases of the cur-
rent term of court is negligible.7
Obviously the Court has abandoned that field, leaving the
final decisions in those areas almost one hundred percent to the
Courts of Appeal. The trend in this direction, which has existed
throughout the 20th Century, reached landslide proportions
after the decision in Erie Railway v. Tompkins, because once it
was established that in these areas it is the duty of the Federal
Courts to declare the local law, there is almost no function which
the Supreme Court can perform any better than a Court of Ap-
peals in divining the peculiarly local law of a particular state. In
any case, without quarreling over comparative competence,
clearly such disputes over local law can no longer be regarded as
of national significance, and by the application of the standard
that the Supreme Court should take cases only of general con-
sequence, cases of this type no longer belong on its docket.
As has been noted in the early 19th Century there was very
little general commercial business, and certainly very little regula-
tion of it. The problems of the 1958-59 Court with a half dozen
5 Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 83 (1804).6 United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Granch) 399 (1806).
71 have lumped the one bankruptcy case at the 1958-59 term, United States
v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 554 (1959) to avoid cluttering the
chart.
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or more cases on the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act obviously reflect not merely a change in the
flow of judicial business but a complete revolution in the entire
economy from the non-manufacturing days of a century and a
half ago. The principal insurance problem of 1958-1959 was
whether the SEC should regulate insurance policies containing
varable annuities,8 or insurance benefits tied to fluctuations of the
Stock Market. This was a concept which could scarcely have ex-
isted earlier, any more than could the notion of the regulation of
the natural gas industry,9 or the problem of the power of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission over the use of coal tar in giving an arti-
ficial color to oranges.'0 What I mean to be saying here is some-
thing more fundamental than that the nature of the cases has
changed: In the more than two dozen cases in this general cate-
gory at the 1958-1959 term, almost every one is dependent both
upon a technology which did not exist a century and a half ago,
as for example the cases concerning the regulation of railroads and
motor carriers, and also upon a conception of the responsibility
of government to regulate, which also did not exist a century and
a half ago. I have put into this miscellaneous catch-all in the cur-
rent year, it is true, one bankruptcy case,1 but it too is certainly
a world away from the problems of another age. In this bank-
ruptcy case the issue was the priority to be given to employers'
contribution to a labor union welfare fund. In the earlier period
the first American labor case was decided in a trial court in Phila-
delphia on the premise that all unions were conspiracies. 2 In the
earlier period, the Sherman Act was still the larger part of a cen-
tuny in the offing and the whole phenomenon of restraint of trade
among the several states (local monopoly of course being well
known) had not yet come into existence.
Both eras involved determination of a fair number of points of
criminal law, and yet with a difference of some general signifi-
cance. The five criminal cases in the first period involved: first,
8 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).0 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 79 Sup.
Ct. 194 (1958); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Sup. Ct. 1246
(1959).
'wFlemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 79 Sup. Ct. 160 (1958).
"1United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 554 (1959).




the source of the criminal law to be applied in the District of
Columbia; 13 second, a determination of the authority of justices
of the peace to make commitments;' 4 third, the famous case of
Ex parte Bollman 5 involving the laws as to treason; fourth, a
counterfeiting case;16 and a fifth case on the scope of the power
of a court martial. 7 The 1958-59 cases are much more suggestive
of the concern of the contemporary Court with the problems of
personal liberty in relation to the operation of the criminal law,
and this even though I have included the right to counsel cases
with the miscellaneous civil rights decisions because of their gen-
eral implications. There are still substantive cases, as for example
whether a Congressman has taken a bribe when he accepts a
campaign contribution in return for a favor;' s but the modern
cases also include much more frequent concern with review of
such matters as the application of search and seizure principles to
the Federal government 9 or to the states, as in the well-known
1959 case involving the power of the State of Maryland to permit
a rat inspector to enter a home without a search warrant.20
This entry of the Supreme Court in modern times into the
review of infringements of civil liberties, which began about
1925,21 represents the most radical alteration of the work of the
Court in the 20th Century. Along with the Judiciary Act of that
year, giving the Court power to determine which cases it would
hear, the new development gave the Court a markedly different
task and powers than it had ever had before.
Both courts had numerous decisions to make on matters of
jurisdiction and procedure. Numerically these would be more
similar in number but for the fact that for the 1958-59 Court I
have classified some of the jurisdiction cases in the new category
of Federal-State Relations for reasons which will be developed in
a moment. Clearly at all times any appellate court has a duty to
make rules for the operation of the judicial system which it heads,
and this has been the task of the Supreme Court from the earliest
13 United States v. Simmxs, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 252 (1803).
14 Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
'58 U.S. (4GCranch) 75 (1807).
16 United States v. Cantrill, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 167 (1807).
17Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 831 (1806).
18 United States v. Shirey, 79 Sup. Ct. 746 (1959).
19 See, for example, Draper v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 829 (1959).20 Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. 804 (1959).
21 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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to the most recent times. Nonetheless there are again some very
great differences. There were important jurisdictional and proced-
ural decisions at the beginning of course-the two most famous
for the earlier era are Marbury v. Madison,22 and Strawbridge v.
Curtiss,2 3 the case settling the fundamental principle of diversity
jurisdiction that all parties on the defendants' side of the lawsuit
must be of different states from all parties on plaintiffs' side. For
the very reason that Marshall was laying down the fundamental
ground rules for the operation of the federal system, it is unlikely
that many later cases could possibly come close to approaching in
broad gauge significance some of his pronouncements unless they
were to be overruled entirely. However, in Marshall's time there
was also a procession of what we would regard as trifling jurisdic-
tional points, particularly in cases arising from the District of
Columbia.2 4 Nonetheless a good half dozen of the Marshall juris-
dictional decisions for the period under analysis clearly outrank
in long-range significance anything decided in 1958-59.
Today the Court largely handles its responsibility in relation to
procedure (as distinct from jurisdiction) through the rules of pro-
cedure for which it has final responsibility, although in more re-
cent times it has acquiesced in the transfer of the primary respon-
sibility in this regard to the Conference of Circuit Judges. The
principal group of procedural matters at the 1958 term related to
the Seventh Amendment and the operations of the civil jury sys-
tem, case after case involving the function of juries in cases of
railroad accidents, insurance problems, or auto accidents.
25
This deep interest in the operation of the jury system is a re-
newed modem phenonenon, and yet would not have seemed odd
to Chief Justice Marshall, who also paid hearty respect to juries.
In the period under analysis, Marshall twice declared that a judge
must give his opinion on the law to a jury,26 but he held that it was
225 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
237.S. S(3Cranch) 267 (1806).
24 Sefor example Knox & Crawford v. Summers & Thomas, 7 U. S. (a
Cranch) 496 (1806), on whether the appearance of an attorney cures a defect
for irregularity of process; and see Thompson v. Jameson, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
282 (1803), on a detail of variance in the Virginia Chancer practice.
25 SeDeen v. Hickman, 79 Sup. Ct. 1 (1958), and Moore v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 79 Sup. Ct. 2 (1958), both disposed of without argument but in-
cluded in the statistics above because of opinions fied with them; Baker v. Texas
& Pac. Ry., 79 Sup. Ct. 644 (1959); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Term., 79 Sup. Ct.
760 (1959); and Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 1184 (1959).
26 Dogas& Mandeville v. M'Allister, 7 U.S. 3 (Cranch) 298 (1806);
Smith v. Carrington, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 62 (1807).
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the duty of the judge to steer clear of the facts. "The Court can-
not be required," he said, "to give to the jury an opinion on the
truth of testimony in any case."27 If in the long intervening years
the federal courts had steered as clear a course as did Marshall in
leaving factual questions to juries, it would not be necessary now
for the Supreme Court so often to recur to that subject.
28
To wind up the work of the earlier Court, there is no longer
any equivalent in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to its decisions
on the questions of the laws of inheritance or the laws of real
property. The Court then and the Court now had problems over
the status of aliens and the rights of citizenship; and the Court
then had problems of slavery. Today, these are replaced by the
post-civil war problems of racial relations. The existence of the
Negro race within the boundaries of the United States has given
to every Court a fair number of problems from the earliest until
the most recent times. As I observed in Marble Palace, with
some detail of materials, "the Court has been habituated to deal-
ing with problems of Negro rights from the very beginning."29
Once again, however, there has been a marked change in orien-
tation. In the beginning, the primary function of the law was
to hold the race in a subordinate position, while now the task
is to raise it to equality.
The really big changes in the nature of the work before the
Court came in the two categories under the 1958-59 decisions
which have no really substantial counterpart in the earlier years.
The first of these are the civil rights cases. I speak now not of
the race relations cases nor predominantly of the cases in the
administration of criminal justice. This includes to a consider-
able extent the cases involving freedom of speech and press,
problems of such modern phenomena as loyalty programs, and
the general difficulties of the contemporary adjustments with
Communists, as well as a few miscellaneous matters. Here again,
27 Smith v. Carrington, supra note 26.
281 have, perhaps arbitrarily, lumped into this same jurisdiction and pro-
cedure category the cases involving the maritime torts, many of which also in-
volve jurisdictional and procedural problems and of which there were the aston-
ishing number of seven at the 1958-59 term. See for example Hahn v. Ross
Island Sand & Gravel Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 266 (1959), on the relation of state and
federal jurisdiction in respect to harbor workers; Karmarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatiantique, 79 Sup. Ct. 406 (1959); Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 468 (1959); and others.29 Frank, Marble Palace 203 (1958).
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there is some similarity between the eras. For example, for pur-
pose of passing upon the jurisdiction of a court martial, the
court in 1959 had to determine that June 10, 1949 was "in time
of peace" even though the war with Germany was not officially
terminated until two years later.30 In 1801, the Supreme Court,
in a very different context, had to determine that the year 1799
was a year of "partial war" with France.31
The differences with respect to this phase of the Courts work
are perhaps half accounted for by the circumstances already de-
veloped above that not until 1925 did the court take general
jurisdiction over state infringements of civil liberties. But how
about the other half? How about claimed invasions by Congress
of the rights of individuals? The milieu which has given rise to
the repressionist activities of recent years has given the court in
1958-59 what is probably the most significant portion of its total
business, being both high in quantity and also in general con-
sequence. The only real analogy in our history to much of the
anti-Communist legislation of modern times is the Alien and
Sedition Acts of the late 18th Century; indeed the Smith Act
is the first peacetime Sedition Act the country has had since
John Adams' administration.
And so we come to remarkable phenomenon that fundament-
ally, matters of freedom of speech did not come to the Court
,until the 20th Century. The restriction on aliens did, as has
been noted; times of international tension lead to a xenophobia
which had its earliest manifestation in the alien act and its most
recent in the McCarran Act, and legislation of this type has
given rise to some litigation over the centuries. But the sedition
legislation of the late 18th Century, though it was enforced in
numerous cases and although it came before some of the Justices
in their trial capacity, was washed out by the election of 1800.
That election was in its own way one of the great ultimate con-
stitutional judgments of American history, a judgment which
cast its shadow for the entire remainder of its century, so that
Congress never attempted legislation of that kind again until
fairly recent times. The result is that Marshall's court was saved
the necessity of considering types of restriction which in the 20th
Century have raised frequent problems.
3 0 Lee v. Madigan, 79 Sup. Ct. 276 (1959).
31Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 15 (1801).
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Finally to be mentioned are those relating to the problems of
federalism, or, essentially, problems of the relations of states to
states or of states to the Federal government. Here there is a
foreshadowing of these problems in the Marshall era; but quanti-
tatively the number is so much less that the relationship is al-
most token. Nevertheless, as to these things, there are direct
antecedents most of the time in Marshall's days, although they
are dramatized by the increase in quantity.
Thus, for example, on the problems of the restrictions by
the states on the flow of interstate commerce or on restrictions
of international trade, Marshall in his thirty-five years on the
bench had essentially three cases-Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v.
Maryland, and Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company,
all cases so famous that any indentification beyond citations is
superflouous. In the entire seven year period here under analysis,
he had none of them. With the passage of time these cases have
become frequent. A remarkable feature of the 1958-59 term was
the unanimous invalidation by the court of an Illinois statute
with particularly burdensome restrictions concerning mud guards
on trucks.32 This was even more remarkable because with the
exception of Morgan v. Virginia,33 which involved segregation
on buses (a very special form of restriction of interstate com-
merce), this was the first unanimous invalidation of a state statute
on this ground in more than twenty years. A case tracing directly
to the great Chief Justice's opinion in Brown v. Maryland on a
taxation of imports and which thoroughly considers and applies
the teaching of that case was a 1959 decision on the rights of
Ohio and Wisconsin to tax certain imports.
3 4
Finally, there has been a vast proliferation from Marshall's
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden insofar as that great case held that
the New York regulation was incompatible with the federal
licensing act in the same area as shipping. From this developed
the doctrine of federal pre-emption of a field, and the pre-emption
cases have grown greatly in number, particularly in labor rela-
tions.3 5 Problems of the taxability of income of foreign corpora-
32Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 962 (1959).
33 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
34 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 79 Sup. Ct. 883 (1959).
35 See for example the recent decisions in Local 24, Teamsters Union v.
Oliver, 79 Sup. Ct. 297 (1959), and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 79 Sup. Ct. 773 (1959).
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lions which present more contemporaneous difficulty are of course
problems which Marshall could not have known both for absence
of the taxes and, indeed, absence of the interstate corporations
during the early period here under consideration."
A problem which Marshall did have occasion to deal with
and which has been absolutely endless in its complexity ever
since has been the whole area of the power of federal courts in
relation either to state courts or state law. Thus, Marshall in 1807
was the first to observe that a federal court could not enjoin a
suit in the state court.3 7 With this may be compared the more re-
cent cases on reference of certain problems to state courts for
adjudication even though the suits were originally brought in
the federal courts, a practice which I may perhaps be indulged to
observe I have elsewhere described as an unspeakably bad one
from the standpoint of the litigants."'
We can perhaps approach the basic comparison being made
between the early and the latest Courts if we come at it not in
terms of classification and numbers but in terms of significant
cases. Enough time has gone past since the decisions of Marshall's
days so that we can farily easily assess which are the most gen-
erally influential decisions of the time; if we wish to approach it
quantitatively, perhaps the number of columns of citations in
Shepherd's Citator is something of an indication of the continued
vitality of an authority and I shall proceed to mention those of
the cases which are most often cited there. For the 1958-59 term,
we do not have the benefit of the long view, and so must make
the best judgments available to us; but for purposes of com-
parison, these must stand and so will be made.
The first seven years of Marshall, the most important decisions
of profoundly general consequence over the long course of
time have been, of course, Marbury v. Madison; three cases in
the field of international relations and ship seizures, including
very serious problems of the interpretation of treaties;3 9 two other
36 Cases at the current term involving these problems are Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 79 Sup. Ct. 411 (1959), and Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 79 Sup. Ct. 411 (1959).37 Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807).
38 See for example City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 79 Sup. Ct.
455 (1959). I have paid my rather limited respects to this practice in Frank, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 146-48.
39 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); United States v. The
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801); and Murray v. The Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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important jurisdictional decisions40 already mentioned; Ex parte
Bollman, supra, on treason; and of considerable importance,
though not quite in the same range, Little v. Barreme,41 holding
that an officer of the United States who exceeds his jurisdiction
may be personally liable. With these cases must be placed,
though at a lower level of highly important and practical work-
aday affairs, the cases on the priority of debts to the Government,
upon limitations on corporations as expressed in their charters,
and on the priority of Government claims in bankruptcy.42 Mar-
shall personally was the author of all of these opinions.
Against this list may be contrasted what I think are likely to
be the most important opinions of the Court at the 1958-59
term. All of the cases decided in 1958-59 are of some impor-
tance, or else the Court would not have taken them within its
now discretionary jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the number likely
profoundly to affect the future of the country for better or for
worse is, as usual, comparatively small; the number of really
major cases is commonly somewhere between five and twenty
percent of all of them. In terms of really long-range significance,
I think that a decision further confining the powers of the execu-
tive agencies to dismiss employees because of guilt by associa-
tion may well prove important.43 So may a decision upholding a
conviction for contempt of the House Un-American Activities
Committee which, I confess I fear, may give a new lease on life
to that body.44 The decision upholding the right of police to
enter a home without a search warrant has such an enormous
potentiality for evil as to be downright frightening.45 At the lesser,
but nonetheless important level of things, the decision on vari-
able annuities mentioned above,46 the decision on the pre-emp-
tive effect of the National Labor Relations Act in relation to
state actions for damages; 47 and perhaps a case on the powers of
40Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) and Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
416 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).4 2 United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805); Head & Amory
v. Providence Irs. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804); and United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1804).4 3 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 79 Sup. Ct. 968 (1959).
44 Barenblatt v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081 (1959).4 5 Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. 804 (1959).
46 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Inc. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).
4 7 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 79 Sup. Ct. 773 (1959).
[Vol. 48,
ROLE OF THE SuPBEmE CouRT
the district courts to enjoin the Labor Board representatives48
may have rather substantial long-range significance.49 The large
group of cases on June 22nd dealing with the requirement to dis-
close certain government reports are also important.50 However,
what might well have been the most important case of the term,
the determination as to whether membership in the Communist
Party violates the Smith Act without any other overt act, was
postponed for reargument in November of 1959.51
While the Court did put over the Smith Act case just men-
tioned, it certainly finished its term with a burst of substantial
business. On the last day, June 29, 1959, it held that state libel
laws are inapplicable to a radio or television station which permits
a political candidate to use its facilities since the candidate is not
subject to censorship by the station, and therefore the station
cannot be responsible for what he says. 2 It again invalidated an
operation of the New York motion picture censorship law, this
time in connection with the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover." The
decision is likely to give considerably greater leeway to motion
picture distribution.583 Finally, in what may be the major decision
of the year, the Court declared illegal the entire system of job
security for persons in private employment.54
And now let us turn to the business of drawing some con-
clusions. The most significant factor about the list of the major
cases of 1958-59 is that Marshall had nothing like them in the
first seven years of his administration and, what is more, scarcely
could have. No "loyalty program" existed; no state abuses of civil
liberties were under Supreme Court review; there were no
Congressional committees or similar state bodies making inquiries
into the political affiliations of the witnesses before them; and
at the lesser level, the economic problems of labor relations or
economic organization which gave rise to the opinions just men-
48 Leedom v. Kyne, 79 Sup. Ct. 180 (1958).
491 would be less than human not to acknowledge the provincial point of
view that the decision that a civil action on a contract made on the reservation may
not be brought against an Indian in the State trial courts will cause a great deal
of difficulty in Arizona for a long time to come. Williams v. Lee, 79 Sup. Ct.
269 (1959).
50 See Palermo v. United States. 79 Sup. Ct. 2861 (1959).
51 Scales v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 289 (1959).
52 Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 1802
(1959).
53 Kingsley, Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents of University, 79 Sup. Ct. 1862 (1959).
54 Greene v. McElroy, 79 Sup. Ct. 1400 (1959).
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tioned had not yet come into existence. What is more, the most
important single area of its work in recent years has been the
Supreme Court's function in the race relations field, although
that area was comparatively quiet during 1958-59. A world of
slavery could scarcely have had an equivalent to the challenge
of equal protection, and Marshall thus had no such problems.
On the dther hand, some but not all of the Marshall pro-
blems were carried over with varying degrees of intensity to
modem times. Perhaps Marshall's greatest work in this period
was jurisdictional; his solution of the great problems by the sheer
happenstance of coming first his left largely lesser problems to his
successors. A greater difference is in the extent to which Marshall
was seriously occupied with problems of international relations.
With the passage of time these problems have been pre-empted
almost entirely by the President and the Department of State or,
to a lesser extent, the Congress. Whereas the original establish-
ment of the Supreme Court was probably fundamentally for the
purpose of providing legal determinations of serious issues of
international relations, this duty is largely gone, and is has today
only a secondary line of problems in that field.55
Using these polar points for comparison, to find a real con-
tinuity of function in the Court from 1801 until now, one must
necessarily reach extremely abstract levels of generalization.
However, these observations, I think, will stand:
1. The Court at any given time reflects some, but not all, of
the basic problems of the country. As the country grows and
changes, so necessarily do the problems confronting the Court.
2. In its relation to the economic life of the country, the Court
in its beginnings and today has been most intimately involved.
Nonetheless there has been an enormous change. The primary
function of the Court in this regard in the early Nineteenth Cen-
tury was in the formation of the common law. This function has
been abandoned substantially altogether and its place has been
taken with the duty of interpreting and applying the regulatory
statutes. 6 However, there is a striking reverse twist; the Court
55 For some discussion of the relation of international affairs to the establish-
ment of the Federal juridicial system, see Frank, op. cit. supra note 4; and for
discussion of the limited responsibilities of the court in international affairs, see
Frank, op. cit. supra note 29, at chapter 13.56 The first documentation of this now familiar shift is Frankfurter & Landis,
The Business of the Supreme Court (1927).
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in the beginning played a much more significant role in relation
to the federal revenue than it does today. The sheer mass of
modem tax law is moving beyond the effective control of the
Court; all six of this year's tax cases put together will have only
a comparative modest effect on the Government's revenue.
3. Both early and late, the enforcement and operation of the
criminal law has received a considerable degree of attention
from the Court; but in modem times there is a much heavier
weight on the constitutional aspects of the operation of that law
than in the beginning, and a lesser attention to the detail of
particular crimes.
4. The Court has at all times had a substantial duty to lead
the Federal system in matters of jurisdiction and procedure.
This it continues to do, but in declining scale.
5. An everlasting duty of the Court is that of serving, as
George Braden once put it, as umpire to the Federal system.
This function continues to present problems of undiminished
intensity.
6. The Court currently takes as a primary duty, the superin-
tendence of the preservation of civil rights. Both in relation to the
states and the Federal government, what is probably the most
important contemporary work of the Court is what it does in the
fields of race relations, of freedom of speech, press and religion,
and in the maintenance of the procedural guarantees of individual
liberty. This effort, as compared with the early Nineteenth Cen-
tury, is a vast departure; but it is deeply grounded in the Twen-
tieth Century.
If from this maze of detail we attempt to reduce the analysis
of the function of the Court today to a few major headings, it
may be said that the duties of the Court now are first, to apply
and interpret the regulatory statutes of government; second, to
superintend at least to some degree, federal civil and criminal
procedure and jurisdiction; third, to achieve harmonious and ef-
ficient inter-relations among the states themselves, or between
the states and the federal government; and fourth, to interpret
the demands of the Constitution in relation to the individual li-
berties of each citizen. This multiple function is the role to
which history has brought the Supreme Court today.
It remains to observe a little concerning the efficiency of
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these operations and to note some of the problems in connection
with them. The most noticeable difference between the early
and the most recent Court is the quantitative difference in the
number of problems to be solved. It took seven years at the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century to produce approximately
as many opinions of the court as in one year today, but the
population between 1800 and 1810, averaged six million. If the
annual volume of opinions may be said to have increased seven-
fold, the population has increased almost thirtyfold.57 Put crudely,
in the early years the Court averaged about four times as many
opinions per million of population as it does today.
Some such decline in ratio is clearly imperative, there being
a limit to how much nine men can do in a year, no matter how
hard they try. With the increase in population continuing, there-
fore, it may reasonably be expected that the diminishing quanti-
tative relationship of the Supreme Court to the general run of
problems of the population will continue. In these circumstances
the percentage of the actual disputes of America which the
Court can hope to effect directly is almost infinitesimal; and the
limit of its power is essentially educational. It has the capacity
to show the way for those who wish to learn it.
Nonetheless, there is a very real danger that the country may
simply pass the Court by and outgrow the institution, which may
not in turn be able to dispose of enough business greatly to
effect the general affairs of life progressively more complicated.
This is why the Court must, if it is to survive, make every blow
count.
In these circumstances, clearly the retreat of the Court from
the common law field was a wise one. Granted that in Marshalls
time the court could and did make a real dent on the general law,
to attempt to do so now would be an utter waste of shot. In other
economic affairs of life, its contemporary significance varies from
the fairly remote or almost trifling at the one end of the scale
to the dominant at the other. In such important matters as the
development of atomic energy, the field of patents, or even the
57 This type of comparison omits two factors, the first that the volume of
opinions was rapidly increasing by 1807. A volume comparison of 1808 with
1958 would show not seven times as many opinions in the latter year, but about
three and one-half times as many. This type of comparison also leaves out of
account the enormous administrative task of the court in reviewing and excluding
the 1500 cases more or less which it chooses not to hear in modem times.
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law of taxation, the Court plays a minor role. On the other hand
in the fields of labor relations, securities regulation, anti-trust law
enforcement (apart from patents), and a portion of the regula-
tion of transportation, the Court is a truly dominant institution
of government.
In the fields of jurisdiction and procedure, the Court is con-
tinuing to do an important job although particularly in the area
of procedure (as distinguished from jurisdiction), the lead has
probably passed to the lower courts. The number of actual inter-
pretations of the rules, either civil or criminal, is small in re-
lation to the incredibly large volume of decisions in those fields.
While I do no think it regrettable that the Court does not spend
its time on comparatively minor matters of rules interpreations,
I do think that it is extremely regrettable that it has allowed
the transfer of a great deal of the rule-making function to the
Judicial Conference. For the very reason that rule-making is
capable of disposing of hundreds of cases with the sweep of a
pen, I would suppose that- this legislative function is the very
type of thing which the Court ought to hold firmly in its own
hands.
In its contribution to the orderly and reasonably efficient
maintenance of the federal system, the Court does its best and
most effective work. Its effort to maintain the country as a large
free-trade area has resulted in substantial accomplishment. The
older issues of the relation of the states to the federal govern-
ment have become minor now because the federal govern-
ment has assumed so much power that what is left to the states,
whether one likes it or not, is of greatly diminished importance.
Perhaps the largest accomplishment of the Court has been in re-
lation to purely interstate controversies. The absence of border
wars among the states is in itself an accomplishment which has
existed in no similar land mass of any substantial population for
anything like a comparable period of time; with the gigantic ex-
ception of the Civil War, this record is virtually unblemished.
For this, the Court may not deserve all of the credit, but it cer-
tainly has earned some of it.
We come finally to the record of the Court in relation to hu-
man liberty, a record which has filled an increasingly large por
tion of its annals since World War I. Here we trace a sadly
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wavering line. In the field of race relations, much has been
done. The Court has maintained a fairly consistent stand since
its invalidation of the Louisville segregated housing ordinance
in 1917.58 From that day to this, through the firm stand of Chief
Justice Hughes in the Thirties, to the invalidation of the white
primary, restrictive covenants, segregation of transportation, seg-
regation in higher education, and finally, segregation in the lower
schools, the court has maintained a firm and, happily, a substan-
tially unanimous leadership. There are limits here of effectiveness.
It is obviously too much for any group of five or nine men to re-
verse the folkways of determined people overnight. But anyone
coming to Kentucky to speak on this subject must do so with re-
spectful deference to those citizens here who have a record of a
job well begun and against great odds. With regard for what I
cheerfully assume is the substantially superior knowledge of this
audience, on this topic, I can do no more than respectfully take
off my hat and salute you for your part in collaborating with the
Supreme Court in the effort to make the American dreams of
equality more nearly a reality.
In the remaining area of civil rights, it sometimes seems to
me that the Court walks a line filled with corkscrew turns. On the
one hand, every man is entitled to counsel, but not if he is in a
state court and charged with less than a capital offense.59 No
person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, but
by reiteration as recently as this year, this does not apply if the
two prosecutors are respectively state and federal.60 The people
shall be safe in their homes from unlawful searches and seizures,
but if a Health Officer says, "I smell a rat," and walks into a house
looking for it, he does not-need a warrant.61
I do not mean to be either glib or captious about cases which
present hard points; particularly in relation to purely Federal
procedure, the Court has particularly in recent years done much
to assure fair trials,62 When a storm of criticism rose up because
of misunderstanding of the Jencks decision, which held that a
witness purporting to give an eye-witness account of particular
58 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 16 (1917).
59 Spano v. People of the State of New York, 79 Sup. Ct. 1202 (1959), is
the most recent word on this topic.
66Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 Sup. Ct. 676 (1959) (five to four decision).
61 Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. 804 (1959 (also five to four decision).
62 See, for example, Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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activities could be cross-examined on the basis of reports earlier
made by him concerning the same subject matter, it may be
noted greatly to his credit that Senator Cooper of this state was
one of those who advised the Senate that the rule was for the
protection of all.03 Nonetheless, I fear that the barrage of opinions
this year, mentioned above, on this point will set back this whole-
some reform.
It is probably true that the Court has contributed a good deal
to maintaining a Federal system of criminal law enforcement
which I think the bulk of the population regards as both effec-
tive and civilized. Part of this is due to the efficiency of the F.B.I.,
of course, but certainly the Court has helped to keep standards
high. On the other hand, in the field of the State administration
of criminal justice, the on-again, off-again quality of the Supreme
Court's review -leaves me, at least, in doubt as to just how ef-
fective it is. In this part of the Court's self-assigned task, I have
real doubts as to whether it is accomplishing much more than
tinkering with the result in an occasional case.64
Nowhere has the trial been more uncertain, the light of leader-
ship more flickering, than in relation to the most fundamental
right of the American citizen, his right to freedom of speech.
It will be recalled that this is an area which the Court entered
late in its life, coming into the field as recently as World War
I; and in the intervening forty years no clear pattern has emerged.
In World War I and in the twenties, while the Court began fre-
quently to turn to the topic of freedom of speech, it was almost
always to declare that in any given instance the freedom had
been rightly abridged; and while the trumpeting dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis gave a call to succeeding decades, theirs
was nonetheless the voice of dissent. In consequence when the
country was gripped by that vast and fearsome spirit of repres-
sion which has so occupied our minds and spirits during the per-
iod of tension with Russia known as the Cold War, the Court
03 The matter, including the Coo er observations, is discussed in Frank, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 194. Whether the Jencks rule has survived the barrage of
interpretation it received on June 22, 1959, in several cases, I do not yet know.
See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 236 (1959).
64 For a banner illustration of what seems to be the precious abstractness of
some of the work in this field, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), a de-
cision which held that the States are governed by the search and seizure require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment-but that the product of an unlawful search is
nonetheless admissible as evidence.
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did little but review the various methods of the repression and
find them good. That phenomenon generally known as "Mc-
Carthyism" rose, exploded, and flickered down on the American
scene without the Supreme Court having done much of anything
to hasten its demise. Under the leadership of our current great
Chief Justice Warren there has been some tendency toward a
more moderate approach, although as this term comes to an
end I share the wonder of some others as to whether what might
be described as the Warren Reform Movement may have spent
itself. Yet the resounding accomplishment this year in the
termination of surveillance and review of miscellaneous industrial
employees shows that there is at least some great effectiveness
remaining in the Warren leadership.
At least this much is painfully clear. The American citizen
owes such liberty of freedom of speech, press and association,
considerably more to Jefferson and Madison than to any majority
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the past fifteen
years. The diligence of the Court to maintain civil rights has
been through its dissenters from Holmes and Brandeis of an earl-
ier day to Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan today. These
men have not had the power to declare the law. They have
given intellectual leadership and stimulus to those of our citizens
who do believe, at a minimum, that when the Constitution of the
United States provides that Congress shall make no law abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press, very few abridgments
are to be tolerated.
Above all else, the historic role of the Supreme Court has
been this: It has been a place in which men, usually able and
almost always dedicated, could gather to deliberate on funda-
mental problems of the American people. One may not always be
satisfied with the result, whatever it may be, and still be grateful
for the existence of the process itself. The fundamental glory of
the Court has been"the integrity of that process and the patriotism
of its members. Anyone of independent point of view is certain
to find what he regards as error in some portions of the Court's
work, but he will find little that is ignoble. It is for this reason
that while the Court may often be subject to purely partisan at-
tack, it is always regrettable when this is so. This is the most
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consistent thread in the history of the Court: From Jay and
Marshall to Vinson and Warren, those who have mounted the
Bench have given their best to the service of their country.
